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This part of the study looks at the impact of the Bank's policies on bureaucratic and political 
corruption. The negative welfare impact of bureaucratic and political corruption is widely 
recognized in Pakistan, though there are differences in the weighting given to different types 
of bureaucratic and political corruption as causes of welfare reduction. Bureaucratic 
corruption refers to the corruption engaged in by state employees. In effect this describes a 
very significant part of overall corruption, as the executive arm of the state is most directly 
involved in service delivery and economic and social regulation. Even before 1997 when the 
Bank decided to mainstream corruption-reduction in its lending programs, Bank lending to 
Pakistan in a number of instances explicitly included governance reforms which implicitly 
targeted the incidence and/or effects of corruption. However, it seems that Bank lending has 
so far produced very limited gains for governance improvement and corruption reduction.  
 
On the other hand, political corruption refers to the corruption which political representatives 
engage in. In countries like Pakistan, political corruption often interlocks with bureaucratic 
corruption in the form of collusion between bureaucrats and politicians. Whether bureaucrats 
take the initiative in involving politicians to protect themselves from state sanctions, or 
whether politicians direct bureaucrats to engage in corruption which benefits the clients of 
politicians, this interlocking is widespread. It means that sustained reductions in corruption 
are unlikely unless both types of corruption are simultaneously addressed. From 1997 
onwards, Bank policies have tried to address the issue of political corruption within the limits 
allowed by its charter. Internationally, the Bank has supported democratization and civil 
society participation in policy-making to make political corruption more transparent and less 
acceptable. In Pakistan and a number of other countries, the Bank has supported more 
specific policies for devolution and decentralization to bring politicians (and bureaucrats) 
closer to the people they service, with the hope of improving monitoring and accountability. 
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The anti-corruption policies adopted by the Government of Pakistan, some of which have 
been supported by the Bank, include targeting Perceptions and Beliefs, for instance through 
organizing workshops and seminars, Institutional Reforms, such as support for 
decentralization and devolution, Organizational Reforms, such as privatization and civil 
service reforms, and Policy Reforms, including those aimed at reducing the scope of 
government intervention in the economy. The scope of this chapter is to look specifically at 
government policies, specifically those supported by the Bank, which are intended to impact 
on bureaucratic and political corruption, and to examine the likely impact of these policies 
given their design and mode of implementation.  
 
We begin by identifying the key drivers of bureaucratic and political corruption and the types 
of policy interventions which have been proposed to reduce or mitigate their effects. We 
then examine the results achieved, or are likely to be achieved given the evidence from 
Pakistan and our extensive interviews with stakeholders. Finally, we conclude by asking 
how appropriate Bank policies have been for achieving the stated goals of corruption-
reduction and improvements in governance, and where attention needs to be focussed in the 
future. Though bureaucratic and political corruption are closely related and support each 
other, for presentational convenience we will discuss these two types of corruption in 
consecutive sections. 
 
1) BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION 
Causes, Consequences and Policy Responses  
By definition, corruption always involves bureaucrats and/or politicians and therefore all 
causes of corruption contribute to either bureaucratic or political corruption. In this chapter, 
however, we will only look at those determinants of corruption which are related directly to 
the internal structure and organization of the bureaucracy and the polity. Here we can 
identify a number of contributory factors. Bureaucrats are likely to be corrupt if they have 
the opportunity to be corrupt and if the expected cost of corruption for the bureaucrat is 
smaller than the expected gain. Developing countries generally have much higher corruption 
than advanced countries because the state typically occupies a strategic position in 
processes of early capitalism. This is true regardless of the specific policies followed, though 
 3 
policies obviously matter in determining the extent and type of corruption. The bureaucracy 
is also typically less well qualified and paid (so the opportunity cost of losing state sector 
jobs is smaller), its internal governance is weaker (so the chances of detection and 
punishment are smaller), and political clientelism is more rampant, (allowing bureaucrats to 
be politically protected and putting pressure on them to distort delivery for political goals). 
While this is true for all developing countries, the incidence of corruption and its effects are 
different because state capacities, policies and social and political contexts vary widely.  
 
Too many bureaucrats 
in areas where they 
have nothing to do
Too few bureaucrats 
in areas where they 
are needed
Bureaucrats create 
artificial restrictions 
to extort from the 
public
Bureaucrats provide 
needed services for 
a high “price”
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associated with the 
creation of 
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rights, lower 
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Figure 1 Key Internal Drivers of Bureaucratic and Political Corruption 
 
We begin with a simple framework which tells us how the structure, organization and pay of 
the bureaucracy help to determine the extent and incidence of corruption and its subsequent 
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effects, and how these factors are reinforced by features of the political structure. These 
internal drivers of bureaucratic and political corruption are outlined in Figure 1.  
 
The first set of factors (Box A) relates to the structure of the bureaucracy and its relevance 
for the tasks the state has to perform in that economy and society. The possibility of 
corruption is substantially enhanced if the structure of the bureaucracy is “wrong” and under 
these circumstances, the type of corruption is likely to be much more damaging for the 
economy. If there are large numbers of redundant state employees (typically on low salaries) 
they are likely to seek to create jobs and incomes for themselves by creating restrictions 
simply to extort rents from the public. On the other hand if capacity to provide key services 
and functions is under-developed, bureaucrats in these positions are able to bargain for a 
price for these services from those who need them most desperately.  
 
Problems with the bureaucratic structure also include an inadequate structure of internal 
monitoring and discipline. It is widely recognized that developing country bureaucrats have 
too much “discretion” which allows them to engage in corruption or deliver poor 
performance without the threat of effective checks. Given the strategic role of the developing 
country state, it is not possible to remove discretion simply by cutting back the state. There 
also has to be effective internal monitoring and disciplining mechanisms. The absence of 
monitoring can result not only in increased incentives for corruption when the bureaucratic 
structure is dysfunctional, it can also result in direct rent-seeking activities by bureaucrats 
even when there is no problem with the bureaucratic structure. 
 
It has also been argued that bureaucratic corruption is encouraged by low pay for 
bureaucrats, because this lowers the potential threat of losing their job as a result of 
corruption or dereliction of duty. This is shown in Box B in Figure 1. The incentive for 
corruption induced by low pay reinforces all the drivers of corruption discussed so far. 
Finally, Box C identifies the political input into the corruption process which is discussed in 
the next section. A clientelist political structure weakens the possibility of bureaucrats being 
held accountable by their political masters. This reinforces the effect of weak internal 
monitoring within the bureaucracy and once again reinforces all the corruption drivers 
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discussed so far. Finally, the last box in Figure 1 shows that politicians may directly lead 
rent-seeking and rent-creation, acting in collusion with bureaucrats.  
 
The consequences of bureaucratic and political corruption in Pakistan are widely 
recognized to have been extremely damaging. Figure 1 shows that we expect the final 
outcome of these types of corruption to be the creation of value-reducing rents (transfers to 
favored clients, monopolistic restrictions which help particular individuals, and so on) a 
reduction in the stability of property rights, lowered investment, and a misallocation of public 
resources. The relative importance of different types of problems created by corruption and 
its impact on different sections of the population cannot be directly measured. However, 
opinion surveys generally show that the public considers corruption by the police and by the 
lower judiciary to be the most onerous types of corruption. In terms of Figure 1, these types 
of corruption take place both because of inadequate or dysfunctional capacity within the 
police and judiciary, as well as inadequate internal monitoring. Thus given the shortages of 
staff, to get the police to investigate a burglary or the judiciary to expedite a land dispute 
case in court, even otherwise honest citizens may have to bribe. On the other hand, 
corruption of these types is also driven by lack of adequate monitoring and accountability, 
so that for instance, interested parties within the public may directly seek rents by using the 
police or the judiciary to seize land illegally or to avoid criminal charges following a theft.  
 
While corruption in the police and lower judiciary impacts on millions of people, and 
therefore comes out on top in opinion surveys, it is not necessarily the case that these types 
of corruption have the greatest economic impact overall. For instance, bureaucratic and 
political corruption are often interlocked at the highest levels, such that politically driven 
imperatives for rent-seeking coming from Box C in Figure 1 can combine with the rent-
seeking incentives of bureaucrats to create rents for powerful clients of the state. Examples 
of these would be the protection of big loan defaulters, the protection of big tax evaders, the 
allocation of public resources such as infrastructure construction budgets to clients of 
politicians who provide inferior construction with the bureaucrats taking a cut, and so on. 
These examples of higher level corruption are less visible and do not directly impact on the 
public’s sense of powerlessness and injustice, but their overall impact on government failure 
 6 
and on economic performance and poverty can be greater because they derail economic 
development significantly. When public resources for education and health are misallocated 
as a result of the construction of poor infrastructure or the employment of sub-standard 
teachers and health workers who are political clients of politicians there is also a direct 
impact on poverty and serious implications for human capital development and long run 
growth prospects. Anecdotal evidence and newspaper reports suggest that the interlocking 
of bureaucratic and political interests results in the misallocation, waste or misappropriation 
of billions of rupees of public resources every year. A detailed study has yet to be done 
which tries to estimate the relative economic damage caused by bureaucratic and political 
corruption of different types. Such a study would be very useful as a starting point for 
identifying priority areas where attention should be focussed.  
 
The Adequacy of Policy Responses. The Pakistan government has addressed some of 
the issues identified in Box A. The structure and size of the federal bureaucracy has been the 
subject of the Committee on Restructuring and Rightsizing the Bureaucracy. Internal 
bureaucratic accountability has been addressed by amending the Federal Public Services 
Commission Ordinance, the Civil Service Act and the passing of a Removal from Services 
Ordinance directly targeted at corrupt bureaucrats. There have also been improvements in 
external monitoring through the setting up of an ombudsman and through the actions of the 
National Accountability Bureau. Pay and compensation issues identified in Box B have been 
addressed as part of the government’s ongoing Pay and Compensation Reform. The 
Government of Pakistan has also attempted to address some of the issues of accountability 
within the political structure shown in Box C through a series of political reforms, and in 
particular by adopting a strategy of decentralization and devolution. Progress on that front is 
discussed in the next section. We will discuss the effectiveness of these responses by looking 
at the extent to which they are likely to succeed in eliminating one or more of the key drivers 
of corruption identified in Figure 1.  
 
A. Reforms of the Bureaucratic Structure. We have seen that both the distribution of 
state capacities and the internal monitoring structure of the state can contribute to the degree 
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and type of corruption a society suffers from. The government of Pakistan has embarked on 
a number of reforms in all of these areas which have received broad support from the Bank. 
 
The Distribution of State Capacities. Theory offers only very broad outlines for 
identifying the desirable structure of government bureaucracy and the functions it should 
perform. At a general level, these functions are well known. They include the maintenance of 
law and order, responding to market failures by providing public goods, correcting 
externalities and carrying out essential redistribution for poverty alleviation and political 
stability. However, the specific content of these functions can and does vary considerably 
even between countries which are considered to have good government. These variations 
depend on the level of development of the economy, its ecology and technology, differences 
in internal political structures and the historical capacities of a state to deliver particular 
services. While there can be no development without a minimum degree of law and order, 
beyond that there is room for considerable variation in the specific capacities which a state 
can try and acquire depending on economic and political needs and prior state capacities1.  
 
The empirical evidence therefore shows a considerable variation in the types of state 
structures which have been able to promote development in developing countries. 
Nevertheless, while successful states can differ quite a lot in the services and regulations 
covered by the civil service, they share some characteristics in common. In all of them, basic 
political stability and security of investments is required. A minimum degree of security of 
private property rights is also required, though the recent example of China suggests that 
investors’ interests can be protected even without a very transparent “rule of law”. 
Successful states essentially display coherence in policy-making at the highest level and state 
leaders have the political ability to pull different parts of the state machinery together to 
                                                                 
1 See for instance, Stiglitz, J. et. al. 1989. The Economic Role of the State. Bank Insinger de Beaufort NV., 
Bardhan, P. et. al. 1990 “Symposium on State and Economic Development”, in Journal of Economic 
Perspectives Vol. 4., and World Bank 1997 World Development Report: The State in a Changing World. 
These considerations justify sequencing governance reforms, Huther, J. & Shah, A. 2000. “Anti-
Corruption Policies and Programs: A Framework for Evaluation”, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper, 2501. 
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deliver services and functions which are perceived to be vital for economic growth and 
political viability2.  
 
Despite the possible variations in the functional tasks which a successful developing country 
state could focus on, clarity about the functions and services which the civil service is 
supposed to perform in a particular case is clearly the starting point of any reform of civil 
service structure. The staffing levels, skills, as well as the institutional and organizational 
structure of the service should be consistent with the functions it is expected to perform. 
Therefore, a necessary precondition for a successful civil service reform program is a 
coherent set of objectives of the leadership carrying out the reform. Coherence in this 
context means the identification of a set of functions, regulatory objectives, service delivery 
objectives and redistributive objectives for the state which make sense given the level of 
development, the political context, and the competencies of state employees.  
 
As Figure 1 suggests, one of the main causes of governance failure and of corruption is the 
presence of dysfunctional and underemployed civil servants who provide no services, and 
who are not therefore responsible to anyone. They have a strong incentive to create 
employment and income for themselves by obstruction and interference. Equally, the 
absence of government capacity in necessary areas also generates pressures for purchasing 
necessary services with bribes and corruption and is a further cause of governance failures. 
Correcting the functional structure of the civil service to make it more consistent with service 
delivery, regulatory and redistributive requirements is the first step for reducing these 
pressures for corruption and for improving governance.  
 
The World Bank's 1998 document A Framework for Civil Service Reform in Pakistan 
identifies the importance of a “long-term vision” specifying the end point of the reform 
process as a necessary precondition for successful reform. The report goes on to 
recommend the areas which the Pakistan civil service should concentrate on. These include 
                                                                 
2 See for instance the comparison of different types of state structures and policies in Asian countries in 
Khan, M. and Jomo, K.S. 2000. eds. Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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developing the capacity for effective, transparent and evenhanded regulation, withdrawing 
from commercially-oriented activities which could be left to the private sector, shedding its 
role of generating employment through the civil service, and effective provision of basic 
social services (pp. 5-6). It recognizes that this is a very general statement of goals. It would 
be up to the reforming authorities to either flesh this out or to offer an alternative vision of the 
types of regulation and service provision which may be appropriate for the contemporary 
Pakistan economy.  
Table 1 Public Sector Employment in Pakistan 
 1993/94 % of 
Total 
1996/97 % of 
Total 
Growth 
1994-7 
Federal Government 452,141 18.2 696,549 24.6 15.5 
Provincial Government 1,586,081 63.7 1,708,014 60.4 2.5 
Total Government 2,038,222 81.8 2,404,563 85.0 5.7 
Federal Corporations 452,283 18.2 424,073 15.0 -2.1 
Total Public Sector * 2,490,505 100.0 2,828,636 100.0 4.3 
* Excluding local government and provincial public corporations.  
Source: World Bank. 1998. Pakistan: A Framework for Civil Service Reform in 
Pakistan. 
 
Table 1 shows that at an aggregate level, employment in the public sector in Pakistan has 
been high and growing. Growth was high even in the 1990s which was a decade of low 
growth for the economy. Indeed, the public sector is widely seen to be not just a service 
provider for society and a regulator of the economy, but by many people as primarily a 
social safety net providing employment opportunities particularly at times of economic 
difficulties. The safety net view of the public sector is supported by the data in Tables 2 and 
3 which show the distribution of public employment at the federal and provincial levels 
respectively across pay scales. There are 22 pay points in ascending order, and officers are 
usually considered to be state employees at a Basic Pay Scale (BPS) of 17 or above. 
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Table 2 Distribution of Federal Employees According to Pay Scale 2000-01 
 BPS 17-22 BPS 12-16 BPS 1-11 Total 
Main Federal Divisions 2,027 2,261 6,886 11,174 
% of Total 18.1 20.2 61.6 100.0 
Attached Departments 8,671 21,759 251,193 281,623 
% of Total 3.1 7.7 89.2 100.0 
Autonomous Bodies 14,696 6,586 69,022 90,304 
% of Total 16.3 7.3 76.4 100.0 
Total Federal * 25,394 30,606 327,101 383,101 
% of Total 6.6 8.0 85.4 100.0 
* for 30 out of a total of 34 federal divisions, excluding Defence, Defence Productions, 
Foreign Affairs and Revenue.  
Source: Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission. April 2001. Report of the 
Committee on Restructuring and Rightsizing of the Federal Ministries/Divisions. 
 
Table 3 Provincial Government Employees by Pay Scale 1996-7 
 BPS   
16-22 
BPS     
8-15 
BPS        
1-7 
Total 
Provincial Government Employment 166,111 356,812 1,172,489 1,695,412 
% of Total 9.8 21.0 69.2 100.0 
Source: World Bank. 1998. Pakistan: A Framework for Civil Service Reform in 
Pakistan. 
 
More than 90 percent of state employees at both the federal and provincial levels are below 
BPS 17. More than 80 per cent of federal employees are below BPS 12 and almost 70 per 
cent of provincial employees are below BPS 8. In terms of the sectoral distribution of 
employment, at the federal level, employment is concentrated in the railways, finance, 
interior and education departments which in 1993 accounted for 63% of federal 
employment. At the provincial level (which in aggregate accounts for more than 60% of total 
public sector employment, see Table 1), the majority across the country work in social 
sectors, particularly health and education (64% in Punjab in 1998, 68% in NWFP in 1997, 
45% in Balochistan in 1997, Sindh figures not available). Relative employment in the social 
sectors has increased since SAP commenced in 1993/94. Thus the two issues concerning 
the appropriateness of the structure of government employment are first, the distribution 
between higher grade and lower grade employees, and secondly the sectoral capacities of 
government. 
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On both these issues, the Pakistan government has recognized that it has a problem. The 
Report of the Committee on Restructuring and Rightsizing of the Federal/Ministries 
Divisions3 addresses in particular the issue of excess employment at lower levels of 
government. This committee asked thirty of the thirty-four federal divisions to formulate their 
own mission statements including statements of functions which each division perceived it 
ought to be providing. On this basis, suggestions were solicited for restructuring and 
rightsizing. The federal government departments themselves responded with a suggested 
downsizing of almost 7% (see Table 4), with virtually all of the surplus employment being 
identified in the pay scales below that of officers. In addition, by applying a reasonable ratio 
for support staff to officers, the Committee on Restructuring identified a further 5% excess 
employment in the lower grades, suggesting a total excess employment of around 12% at the 
level of the federal government, almost entirely concentrated in the lower grades. But mindful 
of the social consequences of redundancy, the Committee did not recommend redundancy. 
Instead it suggested that surplus employees should be placed in a surplus pool to be re-
allocated as required, or to be lost through natural wastage. 
 
Table 4 Restructuring of Federal Government Proposed by Federal Divisions 
BPS 17-22 
Actual Proposed % Change 
25,394 25,032 -1.4 
BPS 12-16 
Actual Proposed % Change 
30,606 28,215 -7.8 
BPS 1-11 
Actual Proposed % Change 
327,101 303,267 -7.3 
Total Federal Government* 
Actual Proposed % Change 
383,101 356,514 -6.9 
* Figures refer to 30 out of 34 federal divisions. 
Source: Government of Pakistan Planning Commission. April 2001. Report of the 
Committee on Restructuring and Rightsizing of the Federal Ministries/Divisions. 
 
                                                                 
3 Government of Pakistan Planning Commission. April 2001. Report of the Committee on Restructuring 
and Rightsizing of the Federal Ministries/Divisions. Islamabad.  
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While the report represents a vital starting point, there are a number of directions in which 
progress needs to be made before civil service reform is likely to address the issues of 
structure and capacity identified above.  
 
i) A Comprehensive Examination of Excess Employment is Required. As the full title 
of the report makes clear, the remit of the committee was only to look at the federal 
ministries and divisions (and even there 4 out of 34 divisions were outside its terms of 
reference). Its terms of reference excluded the provincial level which provides the critical 
health and education services and employs more than 70 percent of government employees. 
Clearly a comprehensive reform process would have to look at the mix of government skills 
and competence across all sectors, services and functions. The provincial level is critical in 
terms of employment and service delivery but it has not yet been subject to an analysis of its 
desired functions, its current competence, the implicit areas of overstaffing and the requisite 
capacity development. In the past, the federal government has imposed employment bans on 
the provincial governments to control the fiscal strain. These bans have not worked in 
limiting employment growth (see Table 1). Moreover, as a senior provincial bureaucrat 
pointed out to us in our interviews, blanket employment bans have often simply led to 
appointments which bypassed procedures not only because of political corruption but also 
because essential services had to be delivered. This simply underlines the importance of a 
prior analysis of the functions which the civil service is expected to perform, including the 
provincial level, if staffing changes are to be focussed at the appropriate locations. 
 
ii) Attention has to Given to the Procedure of Implementation. So far implementation 
of any of the recommendations has been very slow. Progress has been limited to the 
publication of a number of reports but publication of intent is clearly insufficient. Previous 
governments had also identified the problem of excess employment, particularly at the lower 
levels of the civil service and they had introduced employment bans. The track record of 
implementation of previous reform efforts along these lines has not been good. For instance, 
the preceding PML government had employment bans over 1997-1999 and earlier during 
1990-93. Both senior civil servants and politicians confirmed to us that the outcome was 
essentially that a number of employees were put in “surplus pools” on full pay and many 
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were later re-absorbed in other departments. Early retirement schemes have been more 
successful in terminating employment but these suffer from an adverse selection problem 
because more competent bureaucrats tend to take up the offer as they have employment 
opportunities elsewhere4. These observations reinforce the need for a prior analysis of 
required functions and existing strengths and weaknesses of the service before identifying the 
specific categories of employees who need to be hired or fired. 
 
The political constraints facing previous elected governments possibly explain the very 
limited progress made in any restructuring which involved large job losses within the civil 
service. On the face of it, the present military government does not face the same constraints 
and for this reason, many of the supporters of reform whom we interviewed have higher 
hopes of reform under this regime. However, the political constraints facing the regime may 
have changed in the context of the Afghanistan war and its aftermath. Our interviews were 
conducted before the involvement of Pakistan in a new economic and political situation 
which may make the implementation of employment reductions more difficult.  
 
iii) A Consensus on the Objectives and Functions of Government is Critical. While 
there has been some progress in identifying excess employment, there seems to be no 
consensus on what the desired functions of the state are, and therefore on what the 
functional allocation of employment and skills within the bureaucracy should be. The remit of 
the Committee on Restructuring was to ask each existing divisional head to define service 
delivery and to set targets for its own division/ministry. A coherent integrated plan for the 
functional structure of the civil service as a whole is unlikely to emerge through this process. 
Indeed, our respondents in different parts of the bureaucracy did not share a uniform vision 
of the desired functions of the bureaucracy and it appears that support for a unified set of 
goals have not been formulated at the highest level of the state leadership.  
 
The Committee on Restructuring did identify important weaknesses in skill and capacity at 
the highest levels of the Divisions it looked at. While the surplus employment identified by 
                                                                 
4 World Bank 1998. Civil Service Reform op. cit. and confirmed by our own respondents. 
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the Committee has been widely quoted and supported by the Bank, in fact the skill and 
capacity extension at the higher levels was considered by the Committee to be more 
important. This was reiterated by several of the senior bureaucrats we interviewed who 
pointed out that at the highest levels of government (grades 21 to 22) there were a handful 
of individuals servicing a diverse country like Pakistan with a population of 140 million, and 
their skills and training were often inadequate for the tasks they needed to perform.5 
However, for a strategy of capacity building to be supported, the needs have to clearly 
identified and elaborated in the context of a comprehensive plan. 
 
Extensive interviews with senior bureaucrats, politicians and the donor community in 
Pakistan confirmed that no consensus exists about the desired shape of a reformed civil 
service. There were significant differences between respondents about the focus of 
government service delivery and the areas of government comparative advantage. Many 
respondents, particularly within the donor community, but also including political parties and 
some bureaucrats argued that law and order, policing and justice were in greatest need of 
strengthening as they directly impinged on the common man and woman. Others emphasized 
the damage being done by a corrupt revenue collecting department and government 
regulation of trade and stressed a focus on these areas as they may have a bigger indirect 
impact on the poor through the economy. Others, particularly senior civil servants, focussed 
on the lack of regulatory capacity at the highest levels of the civil service dealing with 
economic management, market regulation and social policy, arguing again that these had a 
bigger impact on the poor indirectly through the economy. As one senior ex-bureaucrat 
pointed out, "ninety percent of the sick industries in Pakistan were sick not because of any 
fault of the owners but because of government partnership breaking down".  
 
There were thus a variety of views on the appropriate functions of government. In the 
absence of an attempt to build consensus for a coherent civil service structure based on the 
government's comparative advantage, or even a clear picture of what the reform leadership 
                                                                 
5 According to estimates published by the World Bank, the number of individuals employed at BPS 21 
and 22 was approximately 350 in 1997, see Appendix 1, World Bank 1998. Civil Service Reform op. cit. A 
comprehensive review of civil service structure would have to look not only at the numbers at the 
highest level, but also the adequacy of their functional skills for the tasks they have to perform. 
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itself wanted, it is difficult to claim in abstract what the priority areas of reform are. Priorities 
will depend on a comparison of the desired functions with the actual performance of 
different parts of the state. For instance, it may be that although policing and judicial reforms 
are vital, the gap at some other level is bigger, or vice versa. It is a significant weakness of 
the reform process that discussion and consensus building about the desired structure of 
government as a whole seems to have been absent. One senior bureaucrat suggested that 
the Bank should play a direct role in facilitating discussions and developing a consensus 
about the desired structure of government, going as far as suggesting that government 
structure should be part of Bank conditionalities. This would be counter to the objective of 
local ownership of reform but the frustration of bureaucrats stuck in individual divisions who 
do not see how a comprehensive review can be organized points out a fundamental 
weakness in the current reform process. A piecemeal approach to reforming parts of the 
civil service may end up with a civil service with large dysfunctional parts as well as 
weaknesses in necessary areas, both of which will continue to drive poor governance and 
corruption (see Figure 1). 
 
Internal Monitoring. While getting the structure of government right is necessary 
for improving governance and reducing corruption, it is not sufficient. Figure 1 points to the 
importance of effective internal monitoring for lasting improvements in governance and 
reductions in corruption. A dysfunctional structure of government creates strong incentives 
for corruption, but it is weak accountability which actually translates incentives into actual 
corruption. Moreover, Figure 1 also shows that even if the structure of government was 
“right”, weak monitoring would still directly result in bureaucratic involvement in rent-seeking 
activities. The state can always make a difference to the profit opportunities of individuals 
and they will be willing to pay to influence the state in the absence of internal or external 
monitoring. Thus monitoring and accountability are critical for the civil service to deliver 
results, even after it has been re-structured in line with the functions appropriate for the 
particular economy.  
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A civil service is involved in what Alchian and Demsetz describe as team production6. This 
means that simply by looking at the collective outcome, it is not possible to attribute praise 
or blame to individual members of the team. Someone has to spend time and resources 
monitoring each individual of the team if effort is to be sustained. In the case of a private 
firm, the owners carry out this task because they want to maximize profits. This option is not 
available to a bureaucracy which has to set up a dedicated monitoring mechanism instead. 
Since it is not possible for a central agency to monitor every individual in the bureaucracy, 
the monitoring of individuals has to be devolved. A possible solution would be to devolve 
responsibility of monitoring to functional sub-groups with devolved budgets (such as health 
or disaggregated further to say primary health care), with the central agency only monitoring 
the outcomes achieved by each functional group. Provided the central agency could impose 
effective budgetary or other sanctions against non-performing groups, this would create 
strong incentives for effective monitoring of effort at lower levels where better information 
about individual performance was available.  
 
In this and other related schemes, the effective internal monitoring of a bureaucracy thus 
requires at least three conditions.  
i) Clear Goals for Each Functional or Devolved Group. The central monitoring agency 
has to have clear targets against which to judge the performance of each functional sub-
group.  
ii) Accurate Information about Performance Outcomes. The monitoring agency needs 
to have good information about the outcomes achieved by each functional group.  
iii) Effective Powers to Sanction. The monitoring agency has to have the power to 
impose sanctions on non-performing functional groups. In turn, lower down the chain, the 
head of the division, department or activity has to have effective sanctions against non-
performing individuals. There also have to be obvious checks and balances to ensure that 
these powers are not themselves misused. But without effective sanctions, the entire 
monitoring exercise is futile because there will be no incentive for individual civil servants to 
operate any differently even if their failure to deliver is well known. 
                                                                 
6 Alchian, A. & Demsetz, H. 1972. Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, The 
American Economic Review 62.  
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The reform process has been quite weak in addressing these difficult issues of performance 
monitoring and sanctions. Our interviews with key stakeholders suggested a number of 
observations on each of the three points identified above. 
i) Clear Goals. At the highest political levels, clear goals for various state functions have not 
been evident in Pakistan. Rather, the actions of political leaders have typically revealed 
contradictory goals which they want the civil service to deliver. A number of respondents 
pointed out that while developmental goals are usually professed, in practice, the civil service 
has been frequently used by politicians as an agency for employing their clients. Senior 
bureaucrats pointed out that intervention by politicians seeking to achieve short term and 
partisan goals was a serious problem which subverted the operation of the civil service, 
forcing actions which favored specific clients of political bosses. Thus to the extent that 
political control over the civil service exists, it is often misused to favor specific individuals in 
their efforts to get jobs, avoid arrest for crimes, evade taxes or to get government contracts. 
Ultimately, the problem is that politicians have to respond to a much greater extent to 
demands coming from powerful and well-organized constituencies and individuals, rather 
than to the “general interest”7.  There are no quick solutions to this problem which requires 
political reform of agencies such as political parties such that they become more 
developmental and capable of taking a longer term view at the cost of annoying particular 
individuals who may be important political clients. 
 
Our discussions with stakeholders revealed concerns that using citizens groups as monitors 
in place of the formal political process would not necessarily impose any clearer goals on the 
civil service. Citizens groups would be subject to the same concerns as political 
representatives. What would be the constitution of the citizen group? How would we ensure 
that they represent social interests and not particular interests? And so on. On the other 
hand, one senior political respondent suggested that the prohibition on corporate financing of 
                                                                 
7 Olson, M. 2000. Dictatorship, Democracy and Development, in Olson, M. and Kähkönen, S. eds. A Not-
So-Dismal Science: A Broader View of Economies and Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
These considerations help to explain why there is no simple correlation observed between democracy 
and corruption (Treisman, D. 2000. The Causes of Corruption: A Cross National Study, Journal of 
Public Economics 76) or between democracy and growth (Barro, R.J. 1997. Determinants of Economic 
Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press). 
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political parties since 1984 had inadvertently removed a mechanism through which 
productive interests could set goals for politicians. It is likely that if private sector funding of 
political parties is properly regulated to ensure that favors are not purchased by particular 
businessmen, the general effect may be beneficial. However, since these reforms concern 
political parties and the legislature, they are not ones which a military government is best able 
to carry out. The setting of clear goals for the government clearly has to be part of the 
political process which it is necessary for countries like Pakistan to address to create a 
political constituency for the reform process.  
 
ii) Accurate Information. The government of Pakistan has taken on reforms to make the 
information used to reward bureaucrats more objective and less politicized. Thus, the 
Establishment Division has recommended as part of the current reform drive that promotions 
to higher grades (17 and above) should rely more on examinations and less on internal 
confidential reports by superiors. This may address some of the arbitrariness faced by 
individual bureaucrats facing promotion but it does not address the monitor's information 
requirement for rewarding or punishing individual bureaucrats. This is because the quality of 
a bureaucrat as measured by examinations is not relevant for rewarding success as 
measured by outcomes. The latter requires ongoing monitoring in the performance of tasks 
by group leaders who are located close to the bureaucrat, together with the setting of clear 
target outcomes for the group. 
 
In some areas there has been significant improvements in information flows, such as in the 
Bank supported Project to Improve Financial Reporting and Auditing (PIFRA). 
However, while these improvements are important, they are addressing financial auditing and 
not the problem of monitoring performance outcomes. To some extent the information 
about outcomes can be collected by external monitors. The most obvious interested parties 
who have a theoretical interest in monitoring performance outcomes are the political 
representatives of the people. The information available to political monitors can be 
improved through relatively simple reforms. Senior political respondents pointed out that 
some of these problems can be addressed by providing professional staffing to political 
representatives and strengthening the committee structure of the legislature such that it can 
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perform oversight functions. These reforms would contribute towards monitoring but what is 
also required is an internal monitoring structure which can carry out day-to-day monitoring 
of performance outcomes within the civil service bureaucracy. 
 
To deal with widespread public dissatisfaction with bureaucratic corruption, reforms have 
concentrated on setting up independent commissions charged with investigating and 
prosecuting wrongdoing on the part of bureaucrats. The Ehtesab Commission was an 
Accountability Commission set up in 1996. Its task was initially to investigate individual 
cases and prosecute them in the High Court. Its successor is NAB, the National 
Accountability Board. Its activities are reviewed in detail in another chapter, but it is 
important to point out that NAB does not address the need to have day to day performance 
monitoring of the functions which the bureaucracy is supposed to perform or the services 
which it is supposed to deliver, with effective sanctions for non-performance. While NAB 
does uncover information about governance failures and corruption, it does so sporadically 
on the basis of information passed on by whistleblowers which then leads to further 
investigations and often prosecution. Its effects on governance is through instilling fear in the 
minds of bureaucrats which it is hoped will result in diligence. By itself, it does not lead to the 
setting of achievable functional targets and the monitoring of effort by functional team 
leaders. In the long run the latter is as or more important than prosecuting the corrupt. While 
an extremely corrupt civil service cannot be efficient, an honest civil service can potentially 
also fail to deliver services efficiently. 
 
Many of our key respondents agreed that the internal monitoring of outcomes was critical 
but they also pointed out why such monitoring would be very difficult in the context of 
Pakistan. The monitoring of outcomes is not made easy by the fragmented institutional 
structure of the Pakistan civil service. The civil service is divided into twelve occupational 
groups and services which are engaged in rivalry and a struggle for supremacy8. If a failure 
occurs in achieving outcomes, it is not always clear which tier or occupational group is 
                                                                 
8 Shafqat, S. 1999. Pakistani Bureaucracy: Crisis of Governance and Prospects of Reform, Pakistan 
Development Review 38 (4) pp. 1011-12. This is reiterated in World Bank. 1998. A Framework for Civil 
Service Reform in Pakistan p. 56. 
 20 
responsible. Effective monitoring of outcomes achieved by functionally specified groups 
requires as a precondition a simplification of the civil service structure, with different 
functional groups organized under the same unified hierarchy. The current structure of the 
civil service was the outcome of the 1973 reforms whose underlying motivation was 
political, to weaken the power of the elite Pakistan Civil Service which was seen by the 
political leadership as responsible for the undemocratic traditions of the previous decades. 
However, the time has come to revisit these questions from the perspective of how to 
construct a civil service structure which can allow a central monitoring body to assess 
performance by different functional groups providing clearly specified services or regulatory 
functions. The availability of adequate information for effective monitoring thus also depends 
on getting the structure of the civil service right. 
 
iii) Effective Sanctions. Effective sanctions are the most important of the requirements 
needed to have effective internal monitoring. There is no point in setting clear goals, then 
collecting accurate information on goal fulfillment, if this information cannot be acted on. At 
the moment, the bureaucracy is not set up to deliver identifiable goals and so monitoring 
does not take place to test the degree of goal attainment. But if the civil service were to be 
restructured into functional groups, how easy would it be to also have effective sanctions?  
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Figure 2 Bureaucratic-Political Interface Required for Effective Sanctions 
 
Figure 2 shows the necessary relationship between political goal setting and monitoring and 
the internal monitoring of the bureaucracy. The setting of social goals is a political process. 
Correspondingly, the ultimate sanctioning of bureaucrats has to be done by their political 
masters when they fail to deliver achievable targets. The internal monitoring and sanctioning 
of bureaucrats only becomes effective when the political process responds to the information 
about goal fulfillment, for instance by changing the allocation of resources through the budget 
or (when this is allowed by the constitution of the particular country), by changing the top 
bureaucrats in command of the non-performing functional groups. It is difficult to envisage an 
effective internal monitoring system for bureaucrats which does not ultimately require 
pressure from the political process to deliver results.  
 
In reality, in countries like Pakistan, not only is the bureaucracy not structured into functional 
groups whose performance can be easily monitored, but most importantly, the political 
process does not provide clear goals or the external pressure to ensure that these goals are 
achieved. On the contrary, political intervention far from putting pressure on bureaucrats to 
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deliver, often makes matters worse because they command bureaucrats to favor particular 
clients. In our interviews with key politicians and bureaucrats, the failure of politicians to 
effectively monitor bureaucrats was explained very differently by respondents depending on 
their location within the bureaucracy or the political structure. Bureaucrats explained the 
failure by pointing out the gap in skills and education which typically exists between 
politicians and bureaucrats, to the advantage of the latter. This gap may be less serious at 
higher levels where politicians may be very well-educated and potentially able to interpret 
and respond to sophisticated information but it can be very serious at lower levels such as 
provinces and districts even though notable exceptions may exist even there. Bureaucrats 
also typically argued that politicians were not well-intentioned or well-informed monitors. 
Their intervention, far from improving bureaucratic performance, often forced bureaucrats to 
distort service delivery in favor of particular political clients. 
 
Predictably, politicians argued that bureaucratic autonomy and discretion was the source of 
corruption and they traced this back to the lack of democracy in Pakistan. Far from too 
much political interference being a problem, they identified the problem as too little political 
control over an over-powerful bureaucracy. Combining both sides of the story, it seems that 
while politicians in Pakistan are able to influence decisions in favor of their clients, they seem 
unable to discipline bureaucrats for poor performance. This puzzle, and the fact that 
politicians and bureaucrats systematically blamed each other, suggests that in fact the 
problem is one of widespread collusion and the interlocking of bureaucratic with political 
corruption. There is an obvious problem here for attempts to sanction bureaucrats through 
the political process. If politicians do not have developmental objectives because they are 
responding to particularistic demands, greater political control by politicians over 
bureaucrats may paradoxically lower the efficiency of service delivery. Only if politicians are 
able to take a long term developmental view are they likely to have the incentive to sanction 
bureaucrats who fail to deliver.  
 
The immediate steps taken by the government as part of its reform process have addressed 
the negative aspects of political intervention in the bureaucracy in the past. These have 
included an amendment of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance increasing the 
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Commission’s powers to recruit civil servants directly and to terminate appointments which 
have contravened procedures. This reflects the large number of politically motivated 
bureaucratic appointments which have been made over the years as a result of a fragmented 
and ad hoc appointments system. Political representatives seeking to increase their 
popularity have often offered jobs in the bureaucracy to important client groups and typically 
these appointments have contravened procedures and led to the appointment of less than 
competent people. There has also been an amendment of the Civil Service Act enabling the 
government to prematurely retire inefficient civil servants. A Removal from Service (Special 
Powers) Ordinance has also been issued to remove corrupt civil servants.  
 
Apart from the fact that the implementation of any terminations will be extremely difficult 
politically, the current reform proposals do not address the problem of ensuring effective 
sanctions for bureaucratic performance as outlined in Figure 2. Political goal-setting and 
subsequent pressure from politicians to see results is critical for effective sanctions for non-
performing bureaucrats. The problem is how to ensure that these goals are set for national 
priorities and not for sectional interests, namely the specific clients of politicians. This goes 
beyond bureaucratic reforms to reforms which address the organization of political parties 
such that they do not remain as excessively responsive to sectional and clientelist interests as 
they are today. The current reforms are only addressing the problem of partially redressing 
some of the results of clientelistic politics in the past which led to poor quality appointments. 
They are not changing the political system in such a way that the problem is less likely to 
happen again in the future. 
 
B. Pay and Compensation Reform The theoretical reasons for expecting pay reform to 
lead to lower corruption and therefore to better governance are straightforwardly based on 
a cost-benefit calculation which bureaucrats are supposed to make before deciding to be 
corrupt. This apparently self-evident expectation needs to be qualified by recognizing a 
number of necessary conditions which have to hold before pay increases or pay reform will 
deliver the expected results in terms of lower corruption and better governance.  
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Higher salaries are theoretically expected to lower corruption because they increase the 
opportunity cost of corruption provided there is some probability of being caught and fired9. 
High wages for bureaucrats operate like efficiency wages. It may be efficient to not only pay 
civil servants the market wage for their skill level, but indeed a rent on top of that. This is 
because the work which bureaucrats do is often difficult to monitor and the rent (or 
efficiency wage) creates an additional incentive not to shirk given some probability of getting 
caught and fired. However, this theoretical expectation critically depends on the probability 
of being caught being sufficiently high. Other aspects of pay reform such as greater simplicity 
in grades, monetization of perks, more accurate lists of employees and so on, are all aimed 
at making monitoring and evaluation easier. 
  
A necessary condition for pay increases to lead to lower corruption and better service 
delivery is the existence of good monitoring such that dereliction of duty can be identified 
and punished with at least a moderate probability. High salaries work as an efficiency wage 
if there is a reasonable probability that shirking or corruption will be detected and punished, 
in which case it is the potential loss of the rent which induces the employee to put in the 
effort. This incentive mechanism breaks down if the probability of getting caught, or of being 
fired when caught, is very low. If the probability of losing the high wage when the bureaucrat 
is corrupt is very low or zero, then theoretically, corruption need not decline with pay 
increases10. The cross-national empirical evidence is, as expected, equivocal about the effect 
of pay increases in reducing corruption and thereby improving governance11. 
                                                                 
9 See for instance, Klitgaard, R. 1988. Controlling Corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
Gould, D. & Amaro-Reyes, J. 1983. “The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance: 
Illustrations from Developing Countries”, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 580, Washington D.C. 
10 Besley, T. & McLaren, J. 1993. “Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives”, Economic Journal 
103, point out that if monitoring and auditing is so weak that the probability of catching and firing the 
corrupt bureaucrat is very low, efficiency wages make no sense. Theoretical reservations are also 
expressed by Huther, J. & Shah, A. 2000. “Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs: A Framework for 
Evaluation”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2501 and Khan, M. forthcoming 2002. 
"Corruption, Governance and the Emergence of Capitalism" in Pincus, J. and Winters, J. ed. Re-
Inventing the World Bank . Cornell University Press. 
11 The ambiguous effect of bureaucratic salaries on corruption is empirically confirmed by Treisman 2000 
(op. cit) and Rauch, J.E. & Evans, P.B. 2000. “Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in 
Less Developed Countries” Journal of Public Economics 75.  
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Table 5 Government Pay Scales: Pakistan 1997 
Pay Scale Monthly Income Range (Rs) Estimated Average Allowances (Rs) 
BPS 1-3 1,245-2,070 1,022-1,115 
BPS 4-6 1,360-2,535 1,021-1,039 
BPS 7-9 1,480-3,060 906-1,015 
BPS 10-12 1,660-3,780 1,050-1,056 
BPS 13-16 1,950-5,490 944-1,108 
BPS 17-19 3,880-11,600 1,303-2,008 
BPS 20-22 9,195-17,000 2,350-2,594* 
* Grades 21-22 receive substantial additional benefits in the form of housing and vehicles. 
Source: World Bank 1998. Pakistan: A Framework for Civil Service Reform. 
 
The basic pay and allowances are low relative to the private sector and also in terms of 
international comparisons. Average government pay was 2.3 times per capita income, 
compared to 4.7 for Asia and 6.7 for Africa.12 There is understandably little resistance 
within the civil service to reforms which promise to raise salaries as a way of improving 
governance. But are the conditions under which these strategies are likely to work fulfilled? 
The Pay Award Committee set up by the Pakistan government has conducted its study and 
is recommending a pay and pension increase. However, this committee was not empowered 
to investigate whether the mix of skills should be altered or what the functions of the civil 
service should be. Bringing up the pay of existing civil servants to a level commensurate with 
their skills does not necessarily achieve better service delivery or economic management if 
the civil servants in question are not appropriate for these functions in the first place.  
 
An important question in Pakistan is the issue of the non-monetary perks, particularly for the 
highest two classes (grades 21 and 22) of civil servants. These perks include housing, cars, 
telephone and medical bills and so on. Compared to the highest basic salary of Rs. 17,000, 
a car and house could be worth Rs. 50,000 a month or more. The problem with non-
monetary perks is that gross incomes are not transparent, they are not evenly applied since 
the availability of these perks is not guaranteed for every individual who is entitled to it, so it 
                                                                 
12 S. Schiavo-Campo et. al. “Go vernment Employment and Pay in Global Perspective”, Technical 
Department for Europe, Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, the World Bank, 1997. 
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may easily be the case that effective pay is actually higher than required for some categories 
or for some individuals. Monetizing these perks would increase transparency and may also 
lower the effective fiscal cost provided that the assets generating these incomes for civil 
servants could themselves be monetized (for instance government buildings could be rented 
out instead of being allocated to bureaucrats) and the income from this was greater than the 
extra monetary income which would have to be offered to the civil servants as part of 
monetization. It was pointed out by a number of respondents that one problem with 
monetization would be that it would create a big monetary differential with the next tier 
(grades 18 and 19) unless the latter were also graded up. This in turn would create ripple 
effects further down and the net fiscal cost would then be significantly higher.  
 
In theory pay reform which aims to reduce corruption should aim to offer salaries which 
maximize effort on the part of bureaucrats only there is a reasonably high level of monitoring 
to ensure that there is a significant probability that non-performers or corrupt bureaucrats 
will be caught. On the basis of our discussions with participants in these reforms it was clear 
that such an objective had not motivated the reform process. Rather, it was motivated by a 
commonsensical notion that some catching-up of public sector salaries is due and that this 
alone would contribute to lowering corruption. Theory tells us that raising civil servant 
salaries will not reduce corruption unless there are effective procedures of detecting and 
firing corrupt civil servants. This requires changes in the terms and conditions of civil service 
employment and the setting up of internal disciplinary procedures. We have already seen 
earlier that effective sanctions for non-performing bureaucrats do not exist in Pakistan. 
Unless changes take place which result in more effective monitoring and which make 
sanctions effective, pay increases, though they may be desirable for reducing the gap with 
the private sector and improving the quality of recruits, are unlikely to reduce corruption. 
 
2) POLITICAL CORRUPTION.  
Causes, Consequences and Policy Responses 
We have seen in our discussion of bureaucratic corruption that the political process plays a 
critical role in ensuring that bureaucrats are set clear goals and are held accountable. Far 
from performing this function, many developing countries such as Pakistan have political 
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systems which contribute to corruption because the political system creates pressures on 
bureaucrats to favor particular clients of political bosses. Box C in Figure 1 shows that the 
political system can contribute to corruption both through weak accountability being 
imposed on the bureaucracy, but also directly through politicians themselves driving 
corruption by favoring particular clients for political purposes. A key part of the reforms 
which address systemic corruption must therefore be strategies which aim to reduce the 
susceptibility of the political system to generate political corruption in the form of clientelism, 
and to increase the accountability of politicians, and through them, of bureaucrats. 
Democracy has often been put forward as a strategy which is likely to improve 
accountability and thus reduce the incidence of corruption. In Pakistan democracy was 
suspended when the current regime took over, but there is a commitment on the part of the 
president to return the country to democracy within a specified time frame. However, 
democracy is normally too broadly defined for it to be a useful policy goal. Many 
democracies also suffer heavily from political clientelism and political corruption. Not 
surprisingly, the cross-country empirical relationship between democratization and the 
reduction of corruption is very weak.13 
 
Devolution is a more specific strategy to improve accountability based on the plausible 
assumption that bringing government closer to the people will make it easier for the latter to 
monitor and discipline the state. The devolution program is one of the most ambitious policy 
planks of the present government. Previous military governments, including Ayub Khan in 
the sixties and Zia-ul-Haq in the eighties also implemented variants of decentralization and 
devolution, but this government has made an explicit case for devolution in terms of greater 
accountability being achieved. 
 
The Bank has supported a number of measures to increase the accountability of politicians 
and thereby make political corruption more difficult. Apart from a general support for 
democracy and civil society participation, the Structural Adjustment Credit (FY 2001) 
                                                                 
13 Treisman, D. 2000. “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross National Study”, Journal of Public 
Economics 76. 
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supports the government's devolution program to make government more accountable. The 
government's aim is to improve the quality of service delivery in health, education, 
infrastructure, security and justice. The Devolution Plan of the government was launched on 
August 14, 2000 with the final form of the devolution to be announced in August 2001. The 
government's devolution plan includes the following components:  
 • A substantial fiscal decentralization from the provinces to districts. The World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank have provided technical assistance in setting up the 
legal framework defining the personnel, administrative, fiscal and budget 
management/accountability arrangements involved in the fiscal decentralization. 
 • Parallel to this, there will be political devolution with elected bodies at the district, 
tehsil and union level which will have the job of approving public expenditures on health, 
education and basic infrastructure and subsequently of monitoring implementation. Civil 
servants will be accountable to these local elected representatives.  
 • To improve accountability further, a Freedom of Information Ordinance has 
been completed and is going through a process of consultation. 
 
Devolution is an area where international comparisons are complicated by substantial 
differences in the types of decentralization and devolution which have been attempted and 
differences between countries in their initial conditions. Taking developing countries as a 
whole, decentralization and devolution seems to have a weak effect on corruption, and 
through that on governance, but examples can also be found where devolution had a positive 
effect14. To discuss how and why devolution can make a significant impact on accountability, 
we need to look at the relationship between politicians, bureaucrats and the public in greater 
detail. 
 
                                                                 
14 See for instance Gurgur, T. & Shah, A. 2000. “Localization and Corruption: Panacea or Pandora's Box” 
mimeo, Treisman, D. 2000. “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross National Study” op. cit. 
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The interlocked set of relationships between the electorate, politicians and bureaucrats is 
summarized in Figure 3 showing the relationships between three sets of agents: the electorate 
who are the consumers of government services, the politicians or political power-holders 
who translate their demands and requirements into policy and the government bureaucrats 
who are responsible for service delivery and regulation. To evaluate how devolution  may 
affect the quality of governance, we have to look at all three sets of relationships15:  
 
i) The arrows from the Electorate to the Politicians at different levels of the political hierarchy 
indicate the role of elections and other political processes in communicating the objectives of 
the electorate to political representatives. For effective governance, political representatives 
should not be excessively responsive to (or be captured by) narrowly based interests. 
 
                                                                 
15 Based on Khan, M. forthcoming 2002. "Corruption, Governance and the Emergence of Capitalism" in 
Pincus, J. and Winters, J. ed. Re-Inventing the World Bank . Cornell University Press. 
 
Figure 3 Devolution and Accountability 
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ii) The arrows from Politicians to Bureaucrats indicate the exercise of control by politicians 
over civil servants to ensure that the latter carry out their duties to deliver what the public 
require. Pressure on bureaucrats to deliver is only effective if political control is effective. On 
the other hand, if politicians are excessively motivated by clientelism, the removal of political 
control over bureaucrats may paradoxically deliver better services for the public if 
bureaucrats are less responsive to sectional interests. This argument has often been used and 
misused by dictators to subvert the political process, particularly in developing countries. 
For effective governance, political representatives have to represent collective interests 
rather than specific ones, and bureaucrats have to be answerable to their political masters.  
 
iii) The arrows from Bureaucrats to the Electorate indicate the delivery of services and of 
regulatory functions which in turn are the source of welfare improvements or welfare 
reductions. For effective governance we require transparent outcomes, and the ability of 
society to monitor these outcomes.  
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The most important feature of devolution is a transfer of political power and functions lower 
down the political hierarchy. Where the electorate vote for central or national leaders who in 
turn control the central organs of the bureaucracy to deliver services and regulation, we have 
a centralized political system. In contrast where electors vote for local politicians who deliver 
services by controlling lower levels of the bureaucracy we have a devolved system. Clearly 
not all services and regulatory functions are suitable for devolution, so devolution refers to 
the appropriate mix of services being delivered through a devolved system. In a devolved 
system, more state functions are both delivered and politically monitored at lower levels of 
the bureaucratic and political hierarchy. The expectation that devolution will result in an 
improvement in accountability and governance is based on a number of conditions holding. 
We first identify these conditions logically and then examine the extent to which these 
conditions hold in the reform context in Pakistan. This allows us to assess the feasibility and 
likelihood of success of the reform process involving devolution.  
C. DEVOLUTION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE 
 
1. The devolution reform identifies divisible services which can be provided by lower levels of  
the bureaucracy without sacrificing efficiency and brings both the level of the bureaucratic 
hierarchy delivering these services and the level of the political hierarchy monitoring and 
controlling this level of the bureaucracy closer to the final consumer/elector.  
 
2. Consumers/electors find it easier to politically articulate and enforce their interests over 
local level politicians rather than higher level politicians. 
 
3. Local level politicians find it easier to monitor and control bureaucrats at their level and find 
it more difficult to enter collusive arrangements with them compared to politicians monitoring 
bureaucrats higher up in the representative hierarchy. 
 
4. Local level bureaucrats responsible for delivering services to final consumers are more 
transparent, easier to monitor and find it more difficult to form collusive arrangements with 
specific consumers than higher level bureaucrats responsible for delivering the same services. 
 
5. If these conditions hold, governance will improve in a number of respects: a) the services 
delivered and regulatory functions of the state will be more appropriate for final consumers, b) 
they will be more efficiently produced and c) waste, including corruption, will be more easily 
detected and removed. 
 
1. Identification of Functions to be Devolved. Theoretically, devolution should only be 
applied to divisible services. Otherwise, any monitoring and accountability improvements, 
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even if achieved, would have to be set against increased technical inefficiencies in provision. 
Where an investment is indivisible, devolution will result in diseconomies of scale and 
perhaps inadequate investment because of a free-riding problem between the devolved 
units. In addition, where different government services are complementary, there are benefits 
from centralization of provision up to a point, even at the cost of higher corruption and 
information costs16. This point reiterates the importance of first agreeing on a coherent set of 
services which government should provide (see Box A in Figure 1). This can be extended to 
say that there should also be clarity about which level of government should be entrusted 
with the delivery or provision of particular services or regulations. 
 
Just as a discussion about the overall functions of the civil service in Pakistan has not taken 
place, in the context of devolution, a discussion of which services are sufficiently divisible 
and which should therefore be devolved has not preceded the devolution proposals. The 
proposed devolution envisages a decentralization of service delivery responsibilities from the 
provincial to the district level. The provincial level in Pakistan has been responsible for 
education, health, social welfare, infrastructure, regional planning and water and sanitation, in 
other words for virtually all service delivery. As it happens, much of this can probably be 
devolved without loss of scale economies and complementarities in provision, particularly 
since policy-making with respect to most services will remain at the provincial level. 
However, a number of our interviewees expressed concern that inadequate attention had 
been given to ensuring that revenue would be collected at the appropriate tier of the 
government which had responsibility for deciding on indivisible capital expenditures. 
Concern was also expressed about regionally interdependent infrastructure investments 
being maintained after devolution. 
 
The most important part of the proposed devolution plan is to create a new level of elected 
local political representatives parallel to the district administrative levels of the civil service. 
                                                                 
16 Theoretically, if there are complementarities between different functions provided by government, 
centralized provision can be more efficient, even if the total bribe collected by the centralized agency is 
higher compared to more fragmented provision. Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. 1993. “Corruption”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, Khan, M. 2000. “Rent-Seeking as Process”, in Khan, M. and Jomo, 
K.S. eds. Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
(esp. pp. 131-4). 
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At the lowest level, village and union councils will be directly elected, their vice-chairmen 
and chairmen will constitute the next two tiers respectively, the tehsil and district councils. 
The political heads of the tehsil and district councils, the nazims, will be indirectly elected 
by the village and union council members. The nazims are political representatives who are 
going to be located at the same level as the critically important district level civil servants and 
their job will be to monitor service delivery for the devolved services which will no longer be 
provincial subjects but will instead be devolved to districts. 
 
A significant weakness in the proposed devolution plan which was pointed out by a number 
of respondents, including representatives of political parties, is that at least for the first three 
years, the budget employing civil servants at the district level will remain under the control of 
the provincial government so that the district nazim will have very limited powers to sanction 
non-performing bureaucrats. The nazim will have the power to ask for bureaucrats to be 
transferred but will not be able to decide on staffing levels or to sanction individual 
bureaucrats. This means that in effect political power will not be devolved for a critical range 
of decisions. In the words of one of the politicians interviewed, this devolution “is not 
devolution but only a local bodies election”. A reservation was also expressed that the 
intention of the military regime may be to create a tier of elected representatives and of 
patronage which creates legitimacy for the regime without necessarily moving towards true 
devolution. The experience of previous devolution experiments under military regimes gives 
some ground to hold to this suspicion.  
 
2. Political Control of Electors over Politicians. For devolution to result in better 
governance, the second precondition is that devolution should result in a more accurate 
articulation of the popular will and break down the tendency towards political clientelism or 
the capture of political power by sectional interest groups. One difference between elections 
for provincial representatives on the one hand and village and union representatives on the 
other is that in the latter the size of the constituency is much smaller and so the same 
provincial population will ultimately be electing a much greater number of politicians at the 
local level than they did at the provincial level. Purely arithmetically, village politicians will 
represent the popular interest to a greater extent simply because they are more numerous 
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and therefore the likelihood is that a greater variety of interests will be represented. On the 
other hand, the disparity of organizational and financial power can be as great within a village 
constituency as a provincial constituency since the latter is simply an agglomeration of the 
former. Therefore we should not expect village and union representatives to necessarily 
reflect the interests of the entire population. They are likely to reflect the interests of a more 
broad-based elite than the provincial politicians but it will be an elite nonetheless and the 
interests of the local government elite need not always be more developmental compared to 
the elite represented at the provincial level17.  
 
However, in one respect the people-politician relationship may improve with devolution.  
There may be an improvement in the degree of control which local elites have over their 
elected representatives compared to the control which the same elites have over provincial 
politicians and this may contribute to an improvement in service delivery. But from the 
observations of the last paragraph, we should be wary that delivery may be biased towards 
elite groups at the village or union level who may also try to profit from getting contracts and 
employment by colluding with local politicians.  
 
A number of our interviewees pointed out that it would be too optimistic to expect local 
elections to produce an entirely new class of political representatives who were not 
responsive to narrow clientelist interests at the local level and did not collude with them. One 
weakness of the devolution process in Pakistan is that mass parties are not organizing the 
local electorate along clearly defined programs of service delivery. Indeed, local government 
elections are to be based on non-party competition. This means that the contestants cannot 
rely on mass mobilizations but have to rely on elite-based mobilizations to a greater extent to 
mobilize voters. A number of respondents suggested that this may make the village and 
union councillors less representative of mass interests than they need have been. At best we 
can expect a greater degree of political control over local politicians by local elites, which 
                                                                 
17 In India local government service delivery has been most successful in states such as West Bengal 
and Kerala where elections have been contested in the context of centralized party structures with 
strong developmental and welfarist goals. However imperfectly, these structures gave the poor some 
access to politics. See for example Williams, G. 1999. “Panchayati Raj and the Changing Micro-Politics of 
West Bengal” in Rogaly, B., Harriss-White, B. & Bose, S. eds. Sonar Bangla? Agricultural Growth and 
Agrarian Change in West Bengal and Bangladesh .  
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may eventually translate into better service delivery over time even though service-delivery 
may still not be truly universal in scope. 
 
3. Monitoring of Bureaucrats by Politicians. For governance to improve with devolution 
it is also necessary that local politicians should be able to monitor and control local 
bureaucrats better than provincial politicians are able to monitor and control bureaucrats at 
the provincial level. On the one hand, we can expect local politicians to have a greater 
incentive to monitor and discipline district level bureaucrats if these politicians have to 
answer to local constituencies to a greater extent than provincial politicians. But on the other 
hand, local politicians may have a lower ability to monitor and discipline bureaucrats 
compared to provincial or higher level politicians for at least three reasons.  
 
i) Local politicians may lack sufficient constitutional powers to effectively sanction 
bureaucrats. According to the devolution plan being proposed in Pakistan, district nazims 
will constitutionally lack the power to determine the employment of bureaucrats either at the 
aggregate budgetary level or at the level of individuals.  
 
ii) In developing countries in particular, the educational and status gap between politician and 
bureaucrat may be far greater at the local government level than at higher levels. The district 
bureaucrat in Pakistan is usually well educated since most bureaucrats start their careers at 
the district level and work their way up. On the other hand, the political leadership at the 
national and provincial level is likely on average to be from a more educated stratum 
compared to the politicians at the village and union level from whose ranks the nazim will 
eventually emerge. This may change in the long-run if provincial politics is downgraded as a 
result of devolution and ambitious individuals in the provinces enter district politics instead. 
There are indications in the Pakistani press that some well-placed individuals from prominent 
political families are contesting local elections. Nevertheless, the reservation expressed by a 
number of our interviewees was that the average level of district politician would be lower, 
raising doubts about their ability to stand up to and evaluate the performance of district 
bureaucrats.  
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iii) Apart from the local level politicians' ability to monitor the bureaucrat, there is also the 
question of whether they would be more or less likely to engage in collusive corruption with 
bureaucrats compared to provincial and national politicians. A number of respondents, 
including senior bureaucrats, politicians and businessmen expressed the opinion that political 
corruption may well be significantly greater when local politicians are in charge of monitoring 
key areas of service delivery. Local politicians are more likely to be responsive to political 
demands from powerful constituents. Their lower level of education and the absence of a 
high degree of scrutiny from civil society and the press in isolated locations were also 
suggested as reasons. A few respondents argued the reverse, claiming that local politicians 
will be more closely scrutinized by the local electorate and will be less able to collude with 
bureaucrats. On balance, the expectation of our interviewees was that if collusion and 
corruption is to decline through devolution, it is at best a long-term process and the 
likelihood is that collusion between bureaucrats and politicians will persist or increase in the 
medium term. 
 
Devolution was widely supported by our interviewees on a number of other grounds. First, it 
was suggested that it would strengthen federalism and thereby the unity of the country. It 
was also suggested that the expansion of the bureaucratic and representative structures had 
not kept up with the growth of population and so devolution was a way of addressing the 
fact that the country was essentially under-governed. Even if corruption was likely to 
increase in the short-run, it was argued that in the long-run devolution was necessary for 
raising governance capacity. Others believed that the real devolution of power required was 
from the federal level to the provincial level but the devolution from provincial to district 
levels would at least start the process and raise important constitutional questions. 
 
On balance, the effect of devolution on the politician-bureaucrat relationship and through 
that on governance is theoretically anomalous and in the opinion of many of our 
interviewees, the effect is as likely to be a lowering of monitoring quality and an increase of 
collusive corruption, at least in the medium to short term. 
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4. Monitoring of Bureaucrats by Consumers. For devolution to have a significant effect 
on governance, decentralization should make it easier for consumers to monitor bureaucrats. 
This expectation is theoretically most likely to be achieved because by designating a lower 
level of the bureaucracy as the level having final responsibility for the delivery of a specific 
service, it makes the bureaucrat more accessible for individual consumers with a grievance. 
We would therefore expect greater transparency since it would be more difficult for the 
bureaucrat delivering the service to be able to blame higher levels for failure.  
 
However, this would only be translated into greater accountability if the budgeting for the 
services was also consolidated at the local level, so that failure could not be attributed (or 
actually be due to) funds failing to arrive from higher levels. In those cases where funding 
was dependent on higher levels releasing funds, accountability would depend on the ability 
of consumers to make a more sophisticated assessment that service delivery was 
commensurate with the funding which had actually been released rather than the funding 
which was promised or planned.  
 
Locals will clearly be very aware of failures of delivery by local government. The question is 
what can and will they do about it? Any exaggerated expectation of public responses to 
poor service delivery should be tempered by the experience of the Social Action Program in 
Pakistan which was set up to deliver core public services like health and education. In 
particular SAPP 1 (FY 1994) envisaged community responsive planning and management, 
decentralized service delivery and a greater role for monitoring by civil society. Many 
respondents pointed out that political patronage, nepotism and political corruption subverted 
service delivery without widespread public protest at the point of service delivery. Despite 
attempts to improve governance in the delivery of services, the report of the Auditor 
General’s Office which carries out Third Party Validation of SAPP service delivery suggests 
that the quality of governance remains weak. Summary statistics from the report are shown 
in Table 6, which shows that only about a third of procurement decisions and around two-
thirds of recruitment and site-selection decisions passed the good governance test even in 
terms of the minimal criterion used by the Third Party Evaluation, which is that official 
procedures for making these decisions should have been followed.  
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Table 6 Third Party Validation of Social Action Programme in 2000 to Assess Governance 
Governance Issues Cases Reviewed % with Acceptable Governance 
Recruitment 156 64 
Procurement 3733 36 
Absenteeism 637 31 
Site Selection 1292 62 
Source: Government of Pakistan. Auditor General of Pakistan: Social Action Programme: 
Third Party Validation. March 2001. 
 
The governance failures reported in Table 6 very likely reflect disparities of power at the 
local level between most consumers and the elites who control and have influence over 
government and bureaucracy and who get the lucrative contracts for service delivery often at 
the expense of common people. Keeping these realities in mind, we can expect devolution 
to be only a first step in the right direction as far as monitoring of service delivery by the 
public is concerned. 
 
To conclude, in terms of the conditions we have identified as prerequisites for devolution to 
result in substantial improvements in governance, there are significant gaps which lead many 
of our respondents to qualify their expectations from devolution as it is planned in Pakistan. 
In particular, the areas which are the greatest cause of concern include the following.  
 
First, devolution in Pakistan is not part of an integrated review of the desirable functions of 
government and how these functions should be carried out in terms of levels of government, 
methods of monitoring, and so on. Secondly, even as a mechanism for improving 
accountability, our respondents pointed out the failure to devolve sufficient power to district 
level politicians commensurate with their responsibility of monitoring and disciplining 
bureaucratic service delivery. Thirdly, doubts were expressed about whether local 
government elections can bypass sectional elite interests particularly in the absence of mass 
political parties. Fourthly, the ability of local government politicians to monitor and discipline 
district bureaucrats assumes a high educational level of local politicians and their possession 
of adequate support staff to carry out these tasks. Fifthly, the ability of the public to monitor 
the quality of service delivery depends critically on clear statements of goals at the district 
level and the overcoming of political and status differences by poor people who most often 
lose out from governance failures. Given the logical interdependence of the conditions 
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identified at the outset, these areas of weakness could potentially undermine the results 
expected from the devolution exercise. Nevertheless, as part of a bigger program of 
enhancing accountability and achieving better interest articulation through the political 
process, devolution of some functions of the federal and provincial governments may play an 
important part in governance reforms. In terms of relevance, devolution as a contributor to 
improvements in corruption and governance must be of substantial importance. But for the 
reasons identified above, the contribution of the specific process of devolution being 
implemented in Pakistan is likely to be modest in terms of efficacy and impact. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Bank has been supporting the implementation of a series of measures to improve 
governance and reduce bureaucratic and political corruption in ways which the government 
of Pakistan has identified and which we have described above.  
 
The Structural Adjustment Credit (FY 2001) explicitly records Bank support for the 
government’s governance improvement measures. With respect to Civil Service Reform, the 
actions of the government which are supported include 
 • Amendment of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance allowing it 
greater powers in recruiting civil servants and in terminating appointments which have 
contravened procedures. 
 • Amendment of the Civil Service Act enabling the government to prematurely retire 
inefficient civil servants. A Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance has been 
issued to remove corrupt civil servants. 
 • New systems for better career management, promotion and evaluation. 
 • The Report of the Committee on Civil Service Restructuring and Downsizing. The 
committee reported on reforming the federal government. Recommendations include the 
elimination of around 12% of the employees of federal government, primarily at lower levels 
of the pay scale. 
 • The Report of the Committee on Civil Service Pay and Benefits Reform and 
Establishment Division. This committee recommended broad pay and benefits reforms.  
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While these reports and recommendations constitute actions already taken by the 
government, in granting the Structural Adjustment Credit (FY 2001), the Bank notes that a 
number of follow-up actions are desirable. In particular, it notes that the government should 
 • Implement the revised pay scales and benefits and carry out the downsizing in 
accordance with the federal government restructuring plan over 2001-2003. 
 • Implement career development, training and personnel management reforms as 
envisaged by the Establishment Division. 
 
The Bank has also supported the government’s devolution program. Here, the follow-up 
actions which the Bank recommends in the Structural Adjustment Credit (FY 2001) 
document include 
 • The phased implementation of the administrative and fiscal decentralization 
envisaged in the devolution plan 
 • The full implementation of the political devolution envisaged in the devolution plan 
 • Promulgation of the Freedom of Information Ordinance. 
 
As this credit line has only just been approved, the implementation of these reforms will 
remain to be seen. However, it is noteworthy that the Bank’s Report recommending the loan 
does not identify any mechanisms through which monitoring of the implementation is to be 
carried out, or identify an overall time frame for implementation, or identify steps which the 
Bank can take in engaging with the government over the time frame of the loan if 
implementation is inadequate.  
 
The specific reforms discussed in this chapter were substantially the initiatives of the 
Government of Pakistan. The local ownership content was thus high and this constitutes one 
of the strengths of the reform process undertaken by the present regime. The Bank has only 
recognized the importance of the steps taken by the government in commissioning reports 
and expressing its commitment to push through these reforms. The partnership element could 
have been pushed further in identifying ways in which implementation could be monitored 
and assisted by the Bank. In interviews with senior Bank officials it was clarified to us that 
the reform process was not a conditionality of the SAC. However, since the long-term 
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ability of Pakistan to service its debt depends on social productivity improvements flowing 
from the governance reforms, the Bank could have identified the implementation of key 
components of the governance reforms as important enough to require ongoing assistance 
and partnership with the Bank, even if they were not identified as conditions. If the Bank is 
unwilling to do this, the inclusion of governance reform as a Bank objective is rather 
pointless since the Bank is effectively giving unconditional loans to support the budget untied 
to any outcome.  
 
Taking all aspects of bureaucratic and political reform together, a number of areas are 
particularly weak in the government's reform approach and further attention needs to be 
given to these areas in the future.  
 
First, there has to be much greater clarity about the objectives of government as identified 
by the highest levels of the reforming leadership. Our extensive interviews revealed a wide 
gap between the theoretical requirement of policy coherence and the reality where different 
departments and levels of the bureaucracy, political respondents and representatives of civil 
society, each identified different areas of bureaucratic and political corruption which were 
most important, and different areas where government service delivery should concentrate. 
The determination of the core areas of state action is clearly deeply political and it would be 
inappropriate for the Bank or any outside agency to prescribe in a one-sided way. 
However, the Bank can identify this as an important area where progress needs to be made, 
make available international comparative studies and facilitate a national debate with a view 
to strengthening the political process to deliver a coherent reform policy.  
 
Second, concrete steps need to be taken to strengthen the capacity of the higher levels of 
the civil service in areas of critical importance to be identified through this process. The 
Committee on Restructuring and Rightsizing of the Federal Ministries/Divisions identified this 
as an important area but did not provide a comprehensive study of areas of competence and 
areas of weakness. Indeed this cannot be done before political agreement on the overall 
functions of government as outlined above has been achieved. But here too, the Bank can 
assist in providing technical support for carrying out such a study. 
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Third, a political constituency has to be created to support downsizing the civil service at the 
lower levels. Even reforming bureaucrats who were part of the Committee on Restructuring 
warned us that such a constituency did not exist and indeed in a climate of economic 
downturn, the employment generation tasks of the state were widely expected to continue. 
These respondents pointed out that the political feasibility of a reform package would be 
considerably enhanced if it could be combined with a social welfare program which was 
targeted at the classes and groups which would most seriously suffer from a cutback in low-
level civil service employment. 
 
Fourthly national awareness has to be created about the problem of political clientelism and 
how it destroys the possibility of effective political monitoring of the bureaucracy. Again this 
is a deeply political issue about the nature of internal politics in Pakistan, but effective 
monitoring and sanctions within the bureaucracy are almost impossible to achieve as long as 
the political process remains highly clientelistic, with a built-in tendency to support political 
corruption. Many senior political representatives whom we interviewed refused to accept 
this as a serious problem, even though its importance in Pakistan (and many other 
developing countries) is widely known and recognized both by common people and the 
media. The widespread refusal on the part of politicians to accept political clientelism as a 
major problem paradoxically shows the seriousness of the problem, because politicians 
understand that they will find it very difficult to operate if they actually take a position of not 
responding to the demands of powerful clients. Here too, the Bank can help by educating 
the media and involving social scientists in a national debate on the effects of clientelist 
politics and its implications for attempts to impose effective political controls over the state’s 
service delivery and regulatory functions.  
 
Fifthly, those areas of service delivery which are suitable for devolution should be supported 
with more effective powers for district level politicians to control the budget. The devolution 
program as it is currently formulated has a number of weak points which have been outlined 
in detail in the last section. Of these, the weakness of effective budgetary devolution is the 
most immediate. Without budgetary power, the monitoring by political representatives is 
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meaningless, but of course, the reservations expressed about political clientelism in the last 
point above also have to be kept in mind. Clearly successful and sustained improvements in 
governance and reductions in corruption require simultaneous moves on a number of fronts, 
but even if that is not possible, moves on each front should be well thought through, so that 
even if they do not produce immediate results, they can contribute to better results once 
changes in other areas have also been achieved. 
